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Gestures Historical and Incomplete,
Critical yet Friendly
Vincent Colapietro
“Thought requires achievement for its own
development, and without this development it is
nothing. Thought must live and grow in incessant
new and higher translations, or it proves itself not
to be genuine thought.” – C. S. Peirce (CP 5.595)
 
Introduction: Captivating Pictures and Liberating
Gestures
1 At the center of one of the most famous anecdotes involving a famous philosopher, we
encounter what is commonly called in English a gesture,  in fact, a Neapolitan gesture,
though  one  made  by  a  Turinese  Jew  at  an  English  university.  While  gestures  carry
meaning (9, 69-70),1 they are themselves carried across various borders, geographical,
ethnic,  cultural,  linguistic,  and  otherwise.  Unquestionably,  they  are  readily  portable
carriers of various meanings, not least of all those bound up with a wide array of human
judgments (ranging from contempt and disgust to solicitude and reverence). Whether or
not the gesture to which I am alluding would count as one in Giovanni Maddalena’s sense
is questionable (a point to which I will return).2 But there is no dispute about how we
would ordinarily identify the animated response by the Italian economist Piero Sraffa to
Ludwig  Wittgenstein’s  intransigent  insistence  regarding  meaning  necessarily  being  a
function of logical form. For speakers of English at least, Sraffa’s response is a gesture,
indeed, the paradigm of such a communicative or expressive act. So, unlike the incident
involving Wittgenstein’s poker (Edmonds & Eidinow; also Monk), that concerning Sraffa’s
gestural counterexample directed at Wittgenstein’s adamantine position is enfolded in
hardly  any  controversy.  There  is  little  doubt  the  incident  occurred,  even  less  what
significance it carried for Wittgenstein.
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2 Even so, it is instructive to set this anecdote in context, especially since it proved to be
truly pivotal. It is indeed the point around which Wittgenstein turned from his vision of
language  as  put  forth  in  his  Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus to  that  defended  in  his
Philosophical  Investigation.  Norman  Malcolm  pairs  this  story  with  another  anecdote.
According to the Tractarian account of propositions and hence (at least) this species of
meaning, a proposition is a picture. It is not so much a pictorial representation as a logical
picture,  though the pictorial  and the logical  here might not  be ultimately separable.
Wittgenstein hit upon this idea “when he was serving in the Austrian army in the First
[World] War” (Malcolm 2001: 68).3 As he told Malcolm and “several other persons,” he
read  an  account  in  a  newspaper  “that  described  the  occurrence  and  location  of  an
automobile accident by means of a diagram or map.” Wittgenstein took this map to be not
only  a  proposition  but  also  one  in  which  the  essential  nature  of  propositions  was
rendered perspicuous: a proposition is a picture of reality (Ibid.: 68-9).
3 The complementary anecdote is the one concerning how he came to abandon this picture
of propositions, the one to which I alluded at the outset. As Malcolm recounts the story he
heard directly from Wittgenstein, one day when
Wittgenstein was insisting that a proposition and what it describes must have the
same  ‘logical  form’  Sraffa  made  a  gesture,  familiar  to  Neapolitans  as  meaning
something like disgust or contempt, of brushing the underneath of his chin with an
outward sweep of the finger-tips of one hand. And he asked: “What is the logical
form of that?” Sraffa’s example produced in Wittgenstein the feeling that there as
an absurdity in the insistence [that the proposition must have the form of what it
describes or represents]. (Ibid.: 69)
This broke the hold on him of a picture of what a proposition must be, indeed what
language could only be. (Ibid: 69)
4 “A picture held us captive. And,” Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations adds, “we
could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us
inexorably” (Wittgenstein 1968: §115). As it turns out, however, the picture of a picture
and that of the proposition as a picture held Wittgenstein’s own mind captive and Sraffa’s
gesture broke the hold of that picture.
5 What, if anything, holds Giovanni Maddalena’s mind captive? If it can be shown that a
picture or something else does arrest the movement of his thought, what gestures might I
make  that  would  work  to  loosen  the  hold  of  these  unacknowledged  metaphors  and
unavowed images? As H. S. Thayer notes, “often in the study of philosophic argument, it
is illuminating to watch the use of metaphors and similes. For these serve not only as
means of stating arguments; they sometimes operate, if unconsciously, to guide and help
sustain  the  argument  in  question”  (Thayer  1973:  44).  Beyond  this,  they  tend  to
underwrite historically contingent questions, making them appear to be inescapable or
necessary. Indeed, they can appear so inescapable as to make historical contingencies
appear to be ontological necessities. Part of the task of philosophy is, thus, to exhibit
these contingencies for what they are, thereby freeing thought from vitiating fixations.
6 Here I join Giovanni Maddalena in his keen attention to such frequently ignored features
of philosophical writings. But, above all else, this paper is an attempt to answer these two
questions (What might be holding Giovanni’s own mind captive? What gestures might in
this connection prove liberating?) – nothing more, nothing, less. Ultimately, this means
enacting a series of gestures, some perhaps sharply critical, by which we might loosen the
grip of a certain picture of Peirce, also a certain understanding of the historical task of
pragmatist philosophers after Kant’s critical turn. However critical, these gestures are
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intended to be friendly. For Giovanni and I are truly joined in the communal endeavor of
deepening philosophical understanding of phenomena, at once, utterly commonplace and
deeply significant. In the first instance, we are struggling to discern what stares us in the




7 Above all  else,  Immanuel Kant’s critical project holds Giovanni Maddalena’s historical
imagination  captive.  In  his  judgment,  the  alternatives  are  either  to  abandon  or  to
complete  Kant’s  project  (3).4 Might  there  however  not  be  other  alternatives  (cf.
Christensen)? Does, for example, G. W. F. Hegel abandon or complete Kant’s project? Is
not the most accurate response to the stark alternatives with which we are confronted:
neither – or both! Hegel so radically transformed, by means of an immanent critique, the
Kantian endeavor that orthodox Kantians are certainly justified in claiming that Hegel
has  changed  the  conversation.  But  Hegel  might  counter  that  the  project  cannot  be
completed on its own terms: those very terms require a radical transformation of any
philosophical  undertaking  responsive  to  the  definitive  crises  of  late  modernity.  The
framework is exploded by problems it cannot avoid addressing but cannot effectively
address (e.g., the relationship between nature and freedom, that between heteronomy
and autonomy, that between imagination and reason, and that between self and other).
Hence, Hegel might also go on to insist that his achievement encompasses the completion
of Kant’s project in the only workable sense in which this project can be completed. For it
decisively drives beyond Kant and it does so in the direction of history, experience, and
concreteness.5 Building amid the ruins of such a framework, even while ineluctably using
materials  and  incorporating  aspects  of  the  design  from  the  structure  previously
embodied in these materials, does not commit those engaged in this task of replicating
that design.
8 The  experience of  thinking  over,  yet  again,  what  has  been  thought  over  by  one’s
predecessors is as much an instance of experience as what we more commonly identified
as experience (Russon 2015). The need to do so is, as often as not, inherent in experience
itself: there is an experiential urgency to reflect upon some more or less determinate
experience and, in the course of doing so, we frequently come to the realization that our
inherited concepts provide inadequate resources for this creative task (Diamond). New
tools need to be forged; new conceptions need to be fashioned, if we are going to come to
terms with the experience in question. We might poor new wine into old bottles, but we
would be less than wise to try pouring molten steel into glass containers. “We learn by
experience,” Hegel insists, “that we meant something other than we meant to mean; and
this correction of our meaning compels us to go back to the proposition [in its original
form or in our initial understanding], and understand it in some other way” (Hegel 1981:
39). Even the most radical innovations are continuous with their generative conditions.
Such inevitable continuity does however not precluded truly radical innovation. I would
accordingly insist here: Witness Hegel. Or, of greater, relevance: Witness Peirce vis-à-vis
Kant, Schiller, and Hegel, on one side, Locke, Berkeley, and Reid, on the other.
9 Of course, Maddalena might claim that his attempt to complete both Kant and Peirce’s
project entails transformation. On his account, to complete this project is to offer a truly
synthetic approach to synthetic reasoning, that is, to break with the analytic paradigm
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and to offer a novel framework only hinted at by Peirce. In my judgment, however, this
would be a reasonable but hardly adequate reply. First, the virtually exclusive focus on
analysis  and  synthesis  distorts  our  understanding  of  Peirce  and,  more  generally,
pragmatism.  Second,  the  truly  radical  character  of  Peirce’s  philosophical  project  is
missed. His preoccupation is with not the abstract possibility but the concrete growth of
knowledge. In effect, he replaces epistemology with methodology (or, in his own words,
methodeutic or speculative rhetoric, “the highest and most living branch of logic” (CP 2: 333;
see Fisch 1986; Santaella 1999; and Bergman 2009). As envisioned by Peirce, the task is not
to refute the skeptic,  but to assist  the growth of  knowledge;  not to demonstrate the
abstract possibility of knowing something no one does or even can actually doubt, but to
institute procedures by which concrete opportunities for facilitating paths of inquiry are
seized. Third, the essentially historical and, thus, invincibly open-ended character of all
human endeavors,  including  theoretical  pursuits,  tends  also  to  be  missed  or,  worse,
occuled. Take one of Maddalena’s paradigmatic instances of a “complete gesture” – the
ritual of baptism. This ritual is a call to the community to assist in the difficult, delicate
task of initiating a new being into a form of life. By its nature, it cannot be complete in
itself: in inaugurates a historical task of an indefinitely ramifying nature. Its “beginning”
is the self-conscious continuation of a living tradition, just as its “end” is the self-resolved
commitment to take up a task for the indefinite future.
10 However this may be, Maddalena is certainly correct to claim, “one cannot understand
pragmatism if one’s anti-Cartesianism is not supplement by a profound anti-Kantianism”
(28).  But  what I  am urging is  a  much more profound anti-Kantianism than anything
discernible in The Philosophy of Gesture. To be captivated by problems having their origin
in the dualism of analysis and synthesis is not anti-Kantian enough.
11 This begins to become clear when we disentangle the hermeneutic and the philosophical
aspects of Maddalena’s undertaking. There is, first of all, the interpretive claim (Peirce
falls short) and, then, the philosophical recommendation (we can complete what Peirce
failed to complete by adopting a new paradigm of synthetic reasoning). The philosophical
prescription is however dependent upon the hermeneutic diagnosis. If the diagnosis is
erroneous,  the prescription might  be ineffective –  or  worse (for  it  might  exacerbate
rather than relieve the condition). On Maddalena’s interpretation, we witness in Peirce’s
later thought a decisive drive toward some form “of complete syntheticity” (28). But, also
on his interpretation, this drive stops short: Peirce is allegedly too deeply entangled in
the Kantian framework to offer a completed form of synthetic rationality. This is part of a
broader claim, one directed at not only a single figure in the pragmatist movement but
also the entire movement. The pragmatists “never realized that their research pointed
toward  a  complete  synthetic  pattern,  where  synthesis  is  achieved  through synthetic
tools”  (30).  Maddalena  contends,  “their  tools  remain  an  analytic  way  to  approach
synthetic reasoning” (Ibid.).
12 As an alternative, what I propose is this. What we need is a theory of inquiry based on our
practices of inquiry and, hence, on the practical experience of expert inquirers but also
merely competent and even simply novice ones. This would be a theory rooted in our
experience of doubt but also our experience of overcoming doubt (conducting countless
inquiries in an effective manner). Debates about the meaning of terms are idle or worse if
they are not linked to the preoccupations of practitioners. The clarification of terms by
an inquirer, for the sake of inquiry, is one thing. The definition of terms at the highest
level of generality (e.g. What is knowledge? Or What is art?), with little or no regard for
Gestures Historical and Incomplete, Critical yet Friendly
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-1 | 2016
4
the exigencies of practice (and here this signifies the practice of inquiry) is quite another.
Methodology in the Peircean sense would replace epistemology in its traditional sense
(Ransdell 2000).
13 I offer these reflections and, above all, my criticisms as a gesture of friendship to one
whose  work  I  deeply  admire.  However  they  are  defined,  gestures  do  indeed  carry
meaning (9, 69-70). At the heart of any general theory of signs, there is a synecdoche or
cluster of such figures of speech. At the center of Maddalena’s purportedly pragmatist
reconstruction (or  “completion”)  of  the Peirce project,  there is  the figuration of  the
gesture. Gestures by their very nature however are interpretants and objects, for they are
generated and generated: they are in one respect the offspring of signs and, in another,
the parent of signs, gestural and otherwise. Like all other signs, gestures are invincibly in
complete. Closure is always perspectival and precarious, for it is at bottom the formation
of a habit more fully and finely attuned to the dispositions of those agents and object that
we encounter in experience.
14 “Peirce’s progressive shift from Kant to Hegel” (42) was truly a decisive shift, a fateful
rupture (hence, decidedly not an absolute breach).  Among other things, it was a turn
toward  concrete  forms  of  historical experience,  thus,  a  turn  away  from  formalist
presuppositions  (above all,  away from those presuppositions  in conjunction with the
framing of our questions).
15 Peirce was not endeavoring to give a pragmatist answer to a Kantian question. Much like
Hegel,  he  was  working  toward  articulating  a  pragmatist  framework  of  philosophical
query (Buchler 1955). While Peirce’s undertaking no less than Hegel’s is unimaginable
apart from Kant’s aspirations,  efforts,  and indeed achievements,  it  bursts the narrow
confines of various inherited frameworks, the Kantian as much as any other.
 
Gestures Commonplace and Otherwise
16 Gestures are commonplace. In fact, they are ubiquitous. Not only are they commonplace,
but our understanding of them is as well. For the most part, however, this understanding
is tacit and situated, not explicit and abstract. Moreover, it is practical, not theoretical.
There  is  nonetheless  also  such an understanding of  gestures  in  general.  That  is,  we
immediately grasp the significance of someone extending a hand upon being introduced
to us or the significance of a friend upon leaving turning around and waving an arm. But
we also immediately grasp what such acts in general are. Quite apart from being able to
define words or ideas in a formal, abstract manner, we often have an effective and, in
many instances, a nuanced and subtle comprehension of their meaning. This shows itself
in  our  ability  to  use  these  signs  not  only  appropriately  but  also  creatively.  Peirce
identifies this as the first grade of conceptual clarity. His recognition of this grade of
clarity is,  in effect,  a rebuke of Socrates,  at least as Socrates is portrayed in some of
Plato’s early and indeed other dialogues. In such works as the Euthyphro and the Republic,
Socrates tries to show one or another interlocutor that that individual does not know the
meaning of the words he is using, since he cannot provide a defensible definition of what
almost always is a commonplace work. Socrates appears to take the inability to be able to
provide a formal, abstract definition of these contested words as a sign of ignorance, but
virtually  always  unavowed  ignorance  (indeed,  ignorance  strenuously  “denied”).  In
contrast, Peirce is valorizing our tacit, situated understanding of commonplace terms.
Our ability to use them effectively and, of even greater import, creatively is an indication
Gestures Historical and Incomplete, Critical yet Friendly
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-1 | 2016
5
of our grasp of these terms. At the lowest level of clarity, then, we understand both what
specific gestures signify and, beyond this, what gestures in general are.
17 This however does not mean that either the significance of specific gestures or that of
gestures in general is simple or univocal. At both levels, our comprehension tends to be
subtle and nuanced. Indeed, it needs to be. Our tacit, situated understanding needs to be
as flexible,  variable,  and mobile as are the shifts and shades of significance borne by
gestures.  In  other  words,  this  tacit  understanding  operates  in  real  time  and,  as  a
consequence, a sense of timing (that is, a sense of kairos (Smith 1969)) is characteristically
displayed by not only the utterer but also the interpreter. Silence is hardly univocal. So,
too,  the  significance  of  a  smile  can  only  be  ascertained  in  situ.  A  seemingly  simple
expression turns out to be one capable of carrying widely variable meanings. There are,
after all, smiles of refined contempt and ones of spontaneous joy, smiles of bemusement
tinged  with  beneficent  indifference  and  ones  of  acknowledgment  animated  by  deep
identification with another sentient being (Is it truly absurd to smile at a dog who is a
companion?).
18 For the most part, then, our commonplace understanding of gesture operates on the first
grade of clarity. For various purposes, however, we might feel compelled to fashion a
formal,  abstract  definition  of gesture.  The  relationship  between  our  commonplace
understanding and these theoretical formalizations is hardly straightforward. On the one
hand, we can accord our everyday sense such authority that the very attempt to provide
an abstract definition comes to be seen as an utterly futile undertaking. On the other
hand,  we can possess  such confidence in our ability to fashion a completely general
definition that we ride roughshod over the subtle distinctions embedded in ordinary
language  (Austin  1990).  As  Peirce  insists,  we  cannot  improve  a  language  unless  we
reverence it.6 And we show our reverence for a language by painstakingly attending to
the  unpretentious  genius  embodied  in  our  linguistic  inheritance,  not  least  of  all  by
sharply  focusing  on  the  more  or  less  implicit  distinctions  and  affinities  to  which  a
language bears witness. At the most general level, language is logos or an indispensable
instrument of that Protean power, for it enables us to gather together what is seemingly
disparate but also to set off from one another things apparently identical. Our ability to
distinguish this from that is of a piece with our ability to see this as an instance of that
(e.g., to conceive a smile as an instance of a gesture and, at a higher level of generality, to
conceive a gesture as a genre of actions). Out inability to distinguish this from that means
that,  in  our  understanding,  they  are  indistinctly  fused  together:  that  is,  they  are
confused. Our inability to ascertain affinities (e.g., our failure to discern that a whale is a
mammal)  entails  that  we  are  completely  blind  to  countless  connections  and  the
implications flowing from our discovery of these connections.7
19 Maddalena proposes to offer an abstract definition of gesture rather than first attending
to the tacit meanings carried by this commonplace word. More precisely and fairly, he
offers such a definition after all too hurriedly canvassing the tacit meanings embedded in
everyday language. Even so, one gets the sense – at least, I get the sense – that his efforts
are informed by a felt sense for the tacit richness of quotidian words.
20 At least formally, his utterances indicate a commitment to pragmatism. (In truth, his
commitment is more than formal, but I want to press this point as strong as possible,
since I take this tendency to be far too prevalent among expositors and advocates of
Peirce, not simply Giovanni.) This is nowhere more apparent than in his contention that,
“we can say we clarify something when we transform our vague, familiar comprehension
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into a habit of action, not when we have a good definition” (70). There is however an
irony  here.  While  Maddalena  formally  acknowledges  pragmatic  clarification  as  the
highest  level  of  conceptual  clarity,  he  practically  operates  for  the  most  part  on the
intermediate level of abstract definition. The irony is even greater when we note that, in
the passage just quoted, abstract definition is slighted by Maddalena. For Peirce at least,
abstract definition is a crucial tool for conceptual clarification. To rest content with the
results attained by means of this tool would, in effect, amount to arresting thought. Even
so, pragmatic clarification massively draws upon the tacit understanding of “practical”
familiarity8 but  also  critically  depends  upon  the  explicit  formalizations  provided  by
abstract definitions. We clarify something by defining it abstractly and by translating it
pragmatically into habits of action. While formal, abstract definitions are often necessary
tools to advance the business of inquiry, they are, in Peirce’s judgment at least, never
sufficient  ones.  But  to  say we need to  go beyond them does  not  imply that  we can
dispense with them.9
21 In its most basic sense, Maddalena suggests that a gesture “is any performed act with a
beginning and an end that carries a meaning (from gero = I carry on)” (69-70). But he is
clear that this is not the sense with which he is principally preoccupied in his book: “we
are not just seeking any gesture. Some gestures are only reactions. All gestures carry
meaning, but they do not necessarily serve to recognize an identity fully” (70).10 Complete
gestures, as Maddalena identifies them, are here tasked with a Herculean labor: they have
as their function nothing less than the full recognition of what has proven to be for vast
stretches of human history an elusive identity (e.g., the identity of identity itself, what we
pragmatically mean by the identity of, say, a human person [see Maddalena, Chapter 6] or
the identity of the divine or, more mundanely, that of words). Complete gestures are, in
brief, tasked with full recognition of those historically elusive identities
22 Though  he  tends  to  use  the  adjective  complete,  Maddalena  also  employs  perfect in
conjunction with gestures.  He is  explicit  about their  equivalence:  “here ‘perfect’  and
‘complete’ are actually synonymous” (70). For this and other reasons, it is instructive to
compare  Maddalena’s  conception  of  a  perfect  (or  complete)  gesture  with  Peirce’s
description of a “perfect sign.” Given the importance of this comparison, also given how
little attention is paid to Peirce’s description of such signs, I will quote one of the most
relevant  texts  at  rather  great  length.  In  MS  283,  Peirce  characterizes  “an ordinary
conversation” as “a wonderfully perfect kind of sign-functioning” (EP 2: 391). He takes
pains to explain what he means by a “perfect sign” (MS 283: 279-83; EP 2: note 25). He
does so by asking us to consider “the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which
its occurrence carries with it.” In doing so we come to realize: 
This aggregate will itself be a sign; and we may call it a perfect sign, in the sense that
it involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of
itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical [or inert] condition; you might as well
suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a second, or
any other long interval of time. The only signs which are tolerably fixed [and thus
static or steadfast] are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a sign
is real [as distinct from existent or actual]; only its mode of reality [or being] is not
that active kind which we call existence. The existent acts,  and whatsoever acts
changes [by virtue of acting]…
- Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action upon the
interpretant  is  running  low,  its  sharp  edges  are  wearing  down,  its  outlines
becoming more indefinite.
- On the other hand, the perfect sign is being perpetually acted upon by its object,
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from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, which bring it
fresh  energy,  and  also  kindle  energy  that  it  already  had, but  which  had  lain
dormant.
-  In  addition,  the perfect  sign never ceases  to  undergo changes  of  the kind we
rather drolly call  spontaneous,  that is,  they happen sua sponte but not by its will.
They are phenomena of growth.
- Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of “Existential Graphs”…
- This quasi-mind is  an object  which from whatever standpoint it  be examined,
must evidently have, like everything else, its special qualities of susceptibility to
determination. Moreover, the determinations come as events each one once for all
and never again. Furthermore, it must have its rules or laws, the more special [or
specific] ones variable, others invariable.
23 This richly suggestive characterization of a perfect sign cannot be fully discussed here.
For our purpose, we have the space only to highlight several salient traits of such signs
and, then, only in a rather cursory manner. First, the materiality of any actual sign entails
that the sign is in a sense aging. Second, the inherent dynamism of any sign is of such a
nature that it points to the possibility of indefinite rejuvenation. This is most evident in
the ability of the sign to be acted upon, however indirectly or mediately, by its object.
Third,  this  dynamism  also  means  that  the  sign  is  not  only  ceaselessly  but  also
spontaneously changing. Fourth and finally, the growth of meaning is, among other things,
a process of determination, one wherein the sign is becoming less vague, general, or both
in  some  respects  (while  quite  possibly  also  becoming  indeterminate  –  more  vague,
general,  or both – in other respects).  Paradoxically,  a perfect sign is,  in other words,
perfect  by  virtue  of  its  imperfections,  what  alone  makes  possible  its  perfectability.
Absolute  perfection is  in  a  pragmatist  universe  an ontological  impossibility,  whereas
indefinite perfectability is the only tenable form of the highest good. Signs, at least as
instruments of reasons, partake of the nature of reason: “the essence of Reason is such
that  its  being can never  have been completely  perfected.  It  always must  be,”  Peirce
insists, “in a state of incipiency, of growth” (CP 1: 615). Nothing but the ceaseless growth
of concrete reasonable can be made into the summum bonum. For example, consider the
constitution of a country. A perfect constitution would be one in which its inescapable
imperfections were formally acknowledged by building into its very structure procedures
by which it can be amended, that is, made better (or more perfect) than it actually is. As
such, it would make a virtue of a necessity – its historicity.
24 Let us return briefly to Peirce’s example of a “perfect sign” – “an ordinary conversation.”
What makes this species of sign-functioning or semiosis worthy of such a designation? Its
imperfections  are  likely  to  come  to  light  in  its  prolongation.  The  objects  under
consideration are,  through the mediation of  the interlocutors,  bringing to bear their
weight on the development of  their signs,  however much the limitations and indeed
biases of these interlocutors might distort and conceal various features of the dynamic
object.  In sum,  perfect  signs in the Peircean sense cannot be complete or perfect.  In
contrast, complete or perfect gestures in Giovanni’s sense apparently can attain a form of
closure Peirce would find impossible for any instance of semiosis to attain. Should we use
Peirce’s  notion of  semiosis  to illuminate what  Giovanni  intends by gesture or  rather
should we use Giovanni’s conception gesture to throw light on what Peirce identifies as
semiosis? My own leaning should already be clear. In fairness, however, let us return to a
more direct engagement with Giovanni Maddalena’s innovative proposal.
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Commonplaces Gestural and Otherwise
25 Chapters 6 through 8 of The Philosophy of Gesture are devoted to the topics of identity,
writing,  morality,  and  education.  Maddalena  does  not  intend  them  to  be  merely
illustrative of his suggestive notion of a complete gesture. Rather he turns to these topics
to display the heuristic power of the new tool he has crafted principally in Chapters 3
though 5. At the conclusion of “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce turns to hardness,
weight, force, and reality as phenomena calling for pragmatic clarification. No matter
how  perfect  are  our  abstract  definitions  of  these  diverse  phenomena,  as  abstract
definitions, they are not sufficient. We must break out of the circle of words (cf. Short
2007). Defining one word in terms of others unquestionably has its value. But it also has
its  limitations,  especially  for  anyone  resolutely  committed  to experimental  inquiry.
Accordingly, we must break out of the circle of words immerse ourselves in the spirals of
experience (Colapietro 2016). Such immersion involves striving to attune our habits more
finely and fully to the habits of the beings we encounter in experience. More cautiously
put, such immersion encourages us to strive to accomplish this.
26 The scope of this essay, alas, does not allow me to go into the details of Maddalena’s
treatment of the topics taken up in Chapters 6 through 8. I have taken this occasion to
focus almost exclusively on what I  take to be the heart  of  the matter,  his  ingenious
proposal (his new paradigm of reasoning and, inextricably interwoven into this paradigm,
his new tool of synthesis). If I judge this project to be a failure on its own terms (though this
characterization needs to be qualified), if I take the proposal of this paradigm to be most
superfluous, that is not as harsh a judgment as it  will  almost strike most readers.  In
rendering this judgment, indeed, I stand to Giovanni Maddalena precisely as he stands to
Peirce. There is, in his critique of Peirce and, based upon it, his effort to go beyond his
predecessor – his endeavor to bring to completion what Peirce failed to accomplish –
unmistakable respect for Peirce’s stunning achievements. Failure in a significant respect,
even in a definitive way, hardly precludes success in other respects, often ones of the
utmost  importance.  Such  success  warrants  admiration,  but,  then,  so  too  do  certain
instances of “failure.”
27 However it might be with complete gestures in Giovanni’s sense, human endeavors are
inevitably incomplete. Of course, one might respond to this claim by asserting there is
incompleteness and incompleteness. For example, one might set out to solve a problem
and leave  it  unsolved in  the  main,  not  merely  in  this  or  that  detail.  Even so,  one’s
monumental failure might be more instructive than the minor successes of others. Marx
would take this to be true of Hegel in comparison with numerous other thinkers who
were more successful in either bringing to completion their own task or comprehending
the nature of their endeavor. He deemed it as essential to work through the logic of
Hegel’s errors as to appropriate the insights of his predecessor. Indeed, the appropriation
of such insights required him to work through the logic of these errors. One could not
have the former without undertaking the later.  Analogously,  Maddalena seems to be
working through Peirce’s failures as a way of completing Peirce’s project. But, then, I too
am assumed a task akin to this, only with respect to Giovanni Maddalena himself. This
however brings up the question of  dealing with him on his  own terms.  An immanent
critique can often be a radical critique, one in which the very terms of the controversy
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are profoundly altered.  Hence,  the very formulation of  the questions  is  dramatically
modified.
28 The language of completion and the implication of finality are, in my judgment, to be
avoided. Semiosis in Peirce’s sense implies as much. More fully, semiosis as exemplified in
science and, in turn, as approached by Peirce not only in his Existential Graphs but also
virtually all  parts of  his  mature philosophy offers,  in my judgment,  what Maddalena
alleges to be missing in Peirce. Complete gestures in Maddalena’s sense does not seem to
me to be an advance upon interminable semiosis in Peirce’s sense, not least of all because
semiosis so conceived can never be complete.
29 There is indeed a paradox here. We cannot go beyond Peirce until we have caught up to
him (Ketner 1983). But the only way we can even begin to catch up to him is by striving
with might and main to go beyond him (Short 2007). Giovanni Maddalena is to be praised
for striving to do just this. But, as Kant so memorably noted regarding metaphysics, we
would be amiss to take the will for the deed. He is however not to be praised for failing to
show in greater detail, also with greater care, that Peirce actually failed in approaching
synthetic  reasoning  in  a  synthetic  manner.  In  this  context,  I  prefer  the  adjective
synechistic to synthetic,11 since it shifts the focus from a methodological activity (the acts,
processes, and procedures by which syntheses are achieved) to (in the first instance) a
phenomenological  task,  one  that  of  describing  with  painstaking  accuracy  genuine
continua and, for that matter, degenerate ones as well. There is no question, especially if
we are to be faithful to the spirit as well as letter of Peirce, that we must gather our
phenomenological insights and translate them into methodological maxims, directives,
and principles. But, in philosophy, we do so most effectively when we move cautiously
from phenomenological description to normative reflection.
30 Phenomenologically,  we are confronted first and foremost with continua, ones whose
origins  and  trajectories  are  typically  anything  but  fully  recognizable  by  us.  At  any
historical juncture of virtually any experimental inquiry, the identification of the origin
of a process is provisional, so too that of its termination or simply its trajectory. I take it
that what Maddalena is calling complete gestures would count as genuine continua. But it
is not clear to me whether he would accept my suggestion about how such continua are to
be conceived, in the first instance.
31 In my judgment, then, the direction in which Peirce’s project most needs to be completed
(or carried forward) is not the direction to which Maddalena calls our attention. What we
need most of all is a more thickly pragmatist description of experimental intelligence,
hence a more fully pluralist portrait. This would encompass a more synechistic approach,
but one along the lines already indicated by Peirce’s experiments in formalization (e.g.,
his “Existential Graphs”) and also by his pragmatist account of experimental inquiry.
 
Conclusion
32 A picture captivated Peirce, but did not hold him completely captive. It was the dramatic
figure of experimental intelligence principally engaged in the passionate pursuit of novel
truths, especially as this pursuit was exemplified by such sciences as physics, chemistry,
astronomy, and biology. The Peircean portrait of this arresting figure is, alas, incomplete.
What Giovanni Maddalena suggests in the later Chapters of this richly suggestive book is
very helpful for how to sketch more fully the portrait of this figure.
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33 Such intelligence is, in its way, an instance of continuity. It is moreover (though more
controversially) a creative appropriation of a classical notion, for Peirce’s account of such
intelligence is arguably a reworking of Logos,  the capacity to gather together what is
apparently disparate but also to distinguish what seems essentially identical. Finally, it is
a  self-consciously  historical  and  communal  project.  For  it  concerns  affective
identification  with  historically  evolved  and  evolving  communities  of  self-critical
inquirers. As such, it must be invincibly open-ended. While the language of closure in a
guarded sense might  be appropriate  here,  that  of  completion in any robust  sense is
always out of place.
34 A friend makes a remark. I respond by closing my eyes, then opening them, and turning
my head ever so slightly to my left, suppressing the faintest trace of a skeptical smile. My
friend perceives my gesture as astutely as if I had shouted a protest. “Hide your thoughts!
–  Hide  the  sun and  the  moon.  They  publish  themselves,”  Emerson  insists,  “to  the
universe” (quoted by James in McDermott 1978). We subsequently exchange a series of
nuanced and subtle  facial  expressions,  however  compressed,  before  either  one  of  us
speaks. In the case of Giovanni Maddalena, his brow will often slightly knit, then a smile
will ascend from his jaw to his eyes. The Italian face is remarkably adept as a canvas for
facial gestures, so my description of a smile beginning beneath the lips and mouth is
phenomenologically accurate! To be sure, it is no mean feat to have a smile begin with
one’s jaw. But, then, the human face possesses an irrepressible talent at self-portraiture.
The serious point is that our gestures and other signs can carry the meanings of this
exchange  forward  to  the  point  that  we  reach  a  deep  accord.  The  conversation  is
concluded rather than merely interrupted or broken off. But subsequent experience and
the experientially rooted reflections on the ongoing course of our situated encounters
force us, time and again, to think over what has been considered carefully a number of
times.
35 The cumulative habits  of  ingenious actors  equip these agents  with the resources  for
extemporaneous responses to unexpected turns in a conversation or in the course of
experience.  Our  intelligence  and  world  are  of  such  a  character  that  the  exercise  of
experimental intelligence in the contexts of historical circumstances inevitably get us
into trouble, sooner or later. We are thrust by the very exercise of such intelligence into a
world  for  which  our  intellectual  inheritance,  at  bottom  our  sanctioned  habits,  is  a
hindrance as much as an aid. The very identification of the problems with which we are
confronted  depends  upon  theoretical  creativity.  Our  insistence  upon  framing  the
problems with which we are wrestling in traditional terms is, indeed, part of the problem.
Hence, part of the solution is to disentangle us from these terms. As often as not, this
means freeing ourselves from certain pictures (e.g., the metaphor of foundations and,
inseparably  tied  to  this,  that  of  knowledge  as  an  edifice).  We  effectively  miss  the
historical moment in which we are caught up. The force of experience demands us to
consider candidly what we meant to mean (cf. Hegel 1981).
36 Peirce is one of the most paradoxical of philosophers precisely because he did not miss
the singular character of his own historical moment, while being deeply appreciative of
the abiding relevance of the dusty folios of the medieval schoolmen and the even more
distant writings of classical thinkers. To some degree, all human self-understanding is
however a case of misunderstanding. Peirce did not know quite what he was doing, but he
was in this regard no different from any other human agent. The frustrating elusiveness
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of genuine continuity partly explains this failure, if an inevitable misunderstanding can
properly be called a failure.
37 Giovanni Maddalena’s The Philosophy of Gesture is itself an incomplete account of Peirce’s
various shortcomings in rendering more self-critical and self-conscious the ongoing task
of philosophical inquiry. After Descartes but especially after Kant, the reflexive turn is
integral to the responsible execution of this historical task. But the pragmatic turn saves
the reflexive stance from degenerating into abstract universality and empty formalism
(Smith 1992:  Ch.  5).  We can trace Sraffa’s  gesture to the rough-and-tumble world of
Naples, just as we can ascertain the power of this gesture in the capacity of his fingers
being  brushed  under  his  chin  with  an  outward  sweep  to  dissolve  Wittgenstein’s
intransigence. In the wave of a hand, there can be magic. A world opens. Impasses and
aporias are,  in hindsight,  spells cast over us by our complicity in allowing some fatal
confusion or obscurity to ensnare us. More often than not, pictures are part of this.
38 To return to a  point  already anticipated,  the question of  how to  conduct  an inquiry
replaces the question of whether our efforts at inquiry could ever be successful. In brief,
methodology replaces epistemology, but so too does phenomenology replace metaphysics
as first philosophy. Those committed to formulating a theory of semiosis (Fisch 1986; and
Short 2007) might moreover properly resist allowing this theory to be subsumed under a
philosophy  of  gesture.  The  general  theory  of  signs  fails  essentially  if  it  does  not
encompass a philosophical account of gesture. It is doubtful whether the philosophy of
gesture can carry the weight put upon it by Giovanni Maddalena. More precisely, it is
questionable whether either his conception of gesture truly captures Peirce’s notion of
semiosis  or  this  conception  can  perform  all  the  tasks  to  which  it  is  being  put.  A
pragmatist  approach to  synthetic  processes,  including  rational  deliberation,  must  be
more than a synthetic approach. It must also be historicist as well as phenomenological,
synechistic, pragmaticistic, normative, and ontological. Giovanni Maddalena does much
to illuminate most of these facets.12 He rather than Peirce – or, more accurately, along
with Peirce – misunderstands the nature of his own undertaking. Peirce did not so much
fail to complete his project as he failed to envision its scope. The distinctive form of
experimental intelligence on display in the history of natural science hardly exhausts the
expansive reach of this incomparable capacity. The histories of moral reflection, artistic
endeavor,  religious  worship,  political  struggles,  erotic  engagements,  and  much  else
provide invaluable clues for our portrait gallery of the more striking members of a vastly
extended family. These distinctive forms of experimental intelligence are, in other words,
integral parts of an indeliminable continuum, making each of these forms themselves
instances of continuity.
39 More than anything else, our thought needs to be made more dialogical. One of the most
important ways of accomplishing this is by working to acknowledge the respects in which
it already is dialogical, the depth to which it has been formed in a give-and-take with
nothing less than reality. The “synthesis” that renders our thinking truly synthetic is that
which makes our thinking more vitally and dramatically dialogical. The perfect sign is
perfect  only insofar  as  it  possesses  within itself  the resources  for  its  self-correction.
Almost always, such self-correction takes the form of self-transformation. Consider the
transformations  of  our  understanding  of  energy  or  force  in  the  history  of  our
explorations of the forms of movement in which we are enmeshed.
40 The power of Peirce’s Existential Graphs resides, at bottom, not in their formalization of a
process but in the character of that process. The quasi-interpreter is called by the process
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itself to respond to the quasi-utterer (cf. Pietarinen 2006). What gestures of inclusion,
exclusion, and transformation the quasi-interpreter makes in response to the inaugural
gestures of the quasi-utterer determine the drama of self-correction and, hence, self-
transformation. These Graphs enable to formalize certain steps in a process of ampliative
reasoning and, as a result, enable to identify where we might have taken a misstep. They
are tools of self-criticism and self-correction.
41 In sum, Peirce was not striving to complete Kant’s project. Rather he was endeavoring to
transform theoretical  rationality  into a  deliberate capacity,  hence one dependent  on
dramatic imagination and dialogical ingenuity. On this account, as Giovanni Maddalena
notes, theoria becomes itself an instance of phronesis. This involves a fuller recovery of one
part of Aristotle conjoined to a partial rejection of another part. Moreover, it marks a
decisive  break  with  Kant’s  critical  philosophy,  along  with  a  surprising  alliance  with
Hegel’s profound insights, above all, his deeply penetrating insights into the critical role
of the experience in carrying out the work of philosophy. Finally, it encompasses a vision
of semiosis as dialogue (cf. Ransdell 1976) and, in turn, a vision of dialogue as revelatory
of nothing less than the character of reality. That “most wonderfully perfect kind of sign-
functioning” is perfect only in that its imperfections are destined to be disclosed in the
fullness of time. In the meantime, the only time available to finite, fallible agents such as
we are, we are tasked with assisting the growth of signs. For this, we need very often to
suspend the dictates of cold justice and to follow the promptings of cherishing love (EP 1:
354).
42 My greatest fear is that, in this engagement with a dear friend’s book, I have obeyed these
dictates and failed to follow these promptings. In such an engagement, the all too likely
result of cold justice is a deep injustice. Not only is a cognate of philia the prefix to the
word philosophy but also philia is a word in its own right, designating a form of love at
which distinct, yet inseparable, from the love of wisdom. For most of us, philosophical
inquiry is not a solitary mediation (however many hours of private thought are consumed
by a passionate commitment to philosophical reflection), but a communal undertaking.
More often than not, it is an undertaking conjoining us to individuals with whom we have
deep attachments.
43 The human face of “synthetic reason” is, accordingly, a spirited exchange in which the
participants are mutually encouraging one another to follow the argument wherever it
leads. In the course of such a conversation, we are not infrequently transformed. Our
entrance is inevitably tardy (the conversation has been going on long before we arrive on
the scene) and our exit tragically premature.13 Improvised and incomplete gestures are
the  best  we  can  do.  They  characteristically  draw  upon  a  vast  inheritance,  are
extemporized in a dramatic present, and drive toward an uncertain future. In a word,
they  are  historical.  For  some  purposes,  these  gestures  can  be  conceived  as  having  a
determinate  beginning  and  an  equally  determinate  end,  moreover,  exhibiting  the
singular acts by which the gestures are made, the developmental teleology being served,
consciously or not, by the gesturer, the densely blended character of any gesture, and
indeed much else.
44 For  the  defining  purposes  of  Peircean  pragmatism,  however,  they  are  historical
interventions in an ongoing flow of “perfect signs.” The perfection of such signs resides in
their perfectibility and, in turn, this perfectibility resides in the ways such signs serve as
instruments  of  self-correction.  In other words,  the perfection of  perfect  signs in the
Peircean sense is their continual exposure to radical transformation by the experiential
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realities to which they are responding by generating diverse yet interwoven series of
interpretants (cf. 44).
45 The only synthetic unity ultimately needed is not anything as lofty as the transcendental
unity of apperception. It is only the lowly question, “Don’t you think so?” (MS 636: 26;
quoted at 13). This simple question allows us to gather what we have been discussing and
debating into an explicitly critical focus, but the focus of what can never be anything
other  than an open-ended exchange.  Moreover,  it  concerns  not  the  formal,  abstract
possibility of “I think” accompanying any one of my representations, but the situated,
concrete need to appeal to the other. It is, in other words, exemplary of tuism14 – “Don’t
you think so?” or,  in a less  loaded form,  “What do you think of  this?” And it  seems
especially appropriate to conclude this critical engagement with Giovanni Maddalena’s
important book with just this interrogative gesture. This much is certain: what he thinks
– how in particular he responds – will carry forward the open-ended task of self-critical
inquiry,  without  any  presumption  of  attaining  completion  or  even  approximating
consensus.  In conclusion, then, this “Reader Loquitur” (see,  e.g.,  MS 598)15 asks of the
author of The Philosophy of Gesture, “Your thoughts?”
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NOTES
1. All references, if not otherwise noted, will be to Maddalena 2015.
2. This essay has been at once exhilarating and difficult to write. Thinking through this richly
suggestive text has been an exhilarating experience. Being critical of a dear friend in a public
form has made the task a difficult one. What has greatly added to this difficulty is that I am far
from confident that I sufficiently grasp either the main import or most critical details of this
extremely subtle text (a text as suggestive and rich as it is subtle and, I must confess, elusive).
The author has aptly chosen as his epigram a passage from Peirce: “Crystal clearness […] is in
philosophy the characteristic of second rates. The reason is that the strongest men are able to
seize an all-important conception long before the progress of analysis has rendered it possible to
free it from obscurities and difficulties” (CN II: 84). But this passage needs to be balanced by one
from “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”: “It is terrible to see how a single unclear idea, a single
formula without meaning, lurking in a young man’s head, will sometimes act like an obstruction
of inert matter in an artery, hindering the nutrition of the brain” (EP 1: 127). I am certain that
“complete gesture” is not a meaningless formula, but its meaning calls for a variety of analyses
by which it can be, as far as possible, freed from difficulties and obscurities. My hope is that my
own efforts contribute to this.
3. In Wittgenstein’s Ladder (1991) Marjorie Perloff shows how the Tractatus needs – at least, invites
– to be read in the context of war. The “sublime” vision of logic presented in that work (cf.
Wittgenstein 1968: §§ 94-97) possesses its pathos and power only when set against the mundane
experience of the soldier (also Monk). As far as he is from Wittgenstein, I wonder if Giovanni
Maddalena’s complete gesture is not in its way, however slightly, attached to a “sublime” logic.
Are  historical  practices  in  their  irreducible  heterogeneity  given  their  due  by  him,  does  he
attempt at critical junctures to get back to the “rough ground” (Wittgenstein 1968: § 107) or
rather does he work to ascend to an ideal level?
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4. James was emphatic: “The true line of philosophic progress lies, in short, it seems to me, not so
much through Kant as round him to the point where now we stand” (James 1975a: 269). This is well
known. Far less well known, however, was the mature Peirce’s caustic disparagement of Kant’s
monumental  book:  he  characterized  the  first  Critique as  “the  very  chimæra of  the  history  of
philosophy, according to the tongues of fame […] but in reality nothing more portentous than a
sickly little nanny-goat masquerading as a world-shatterer” (MS 609: 10; quoted in Fisch 1986:
257). While Peirce might have been led to Kant’s critical project by Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters, and
while he might have devoted several early years to an intense study of the first Critique,  the
mature  Peirce  moved decisively  beyond Kant.  I  am strongly  disposed  to  think  he  did  so  by
transforming what he took to be the task of philosophy. When late in his life he looked in the
mirror of self-reflection, he has struck by his resemblance not to Kant but to Hegel (CP 1.42; and
Colapietro 2013).
5. In The Meaning of Truth, James stresses: “The whole originality in pragmatism. The whole point
in it, is its use of the concrete way of seeing. It begins with concreteness, and returns and ends
with it” (James 1975b: 281-2). As it turns out, however, Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formalism is for
the most part in the name of concreteness, just as Marx’s critique of Hegel’s “idealism” was.
“How to make our philosophies concrete” is, for pragmatists and others, as urgent as “How to
make are ideas clear.”
6. In MS 279 (“The Basis of Pragmaticism,” circa 1905), Peirce writes, “a language is a thing to be
reverenced; and I protest that a man who does not reverence a given language is not in the
proper frame of mind to undertake its improvements” (quoted in Colapietro 1989: 4).  In this
manuscript, Peirce argues that it is a great mistake to attempt reforming English by adopting
German expressions out of harmony with it.
7. In Praxis and Action, Richard J. Bernstein suggests: “There is a descriptive, empirical, pragmatic
temper manifested in Peirce’s use of the categories. The ‘proof’ or, more accurately, the adequacy
of the categories is to be found in the ways in which Peirce uses them to illuminate fundamental
similarities and differences in everything we encounter” (Bernstein 1971: 178).
8. I am disposed to identify the first grade of conceptual clarity as “dumb smarts” because it is
for  the  most  part  a  linguistically  tacit  (or  inarticulate)  form of  situated  intelligence.  In  one
respect,  it  is  “dumb”  or  inarticulate  (e.g.,  the  experienced  equestrian  might  not  be  able  to
express in words what she comprehends in and through her body when engaged while riding in
the  intricate  exchange  between  herself  and  her  horse).  In  another  sense,  however,  it  is
remarkably intelligence and hence articulate. Intelligence is indeed by its very nature articulate,
since it involves the capacity to draw distinctions and to draw from them implications – often in
the blink of  an eye.  The slightest  shift  in the weight of  the horse might to the experienced
equestrian signal the imminent possibility an immense disaster. The subtle sounds discernible to
the ears of the experienced mechanic would be another example of how the situated intelligence
of the expert practitioner is definable in terms of articulation in some form. The deft, precise
adjustments made by such a mechanic to the auditory clues emanating from the engine reveal
that this individual’s expertise resides in both knowing what different sounds mean and knowing
how to respond effectively and differentially to the variable sounds. As William James notes in
The Meaning of Truth,  “you cannot keep hows and whats asunder” (James 1975b: 275; emphasis
added), at least in the “universe of concrete facts.”
9. As it turns out, however, this is a strategic question. Occasionally the insistent demand for
abstract definitions is a heuristic impediment,  not a methodological  necessity.  Moreover,  the
fixation on the crafting of such definitions can result in the increasing poverty of a discourse. For
example, the extent to which epistemology becomes a quest for a formal, abstract definition of
knowledge  or  aesthetics  becomes  a  quest  for  such  a  definition  of  art,  they  have  become
impoverished fields, taking us away from the richness of our epistemic practices in the one case
and that of our artistic contrivances in the other.
Gestures Historical and Incomplete, Critical yet Friendly
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-1 | 2016
17
10. The “only” here is troublesome, as is the word “reaction.” If we replaced the word “reaction”
with “response,” I wonder if there would be any warrant for the word “only.” Every gesture is a
response and,  as  such,  carries  meaning  by  taking  up  –  both  by  carrying  forward  and  not
infrequently by working against – trajectories of significance carried by the gestures and other
phenomena to which the gesture is responding. In other words, gestures are always parts of a
continuum and, as such, are themselves continuum. This renders problematic their origins and
outcomes. For example, I respond to your gesture in this situation, but in fact in doing so I am
picking up the thread of a conversation commenced long ago. We might also grab the other end
of the stick. The death of a friend does not mark the end of our conversation with that individual.
For instance, I can still vividly hear John E. Smith’s voice, above all, in questions he would pose,
objections he would raise, and qualifications he would insist upon. Without question, this is no
substitute for his actual voice. But these auditory illusions are dialogical realities in which the
power  of  the  would-do and  would-be here  as  everywhere  else  outstrips,  in  a  certain  sense,
actuality.
11. In fairness to Giovanni Maddalena, his synthetic approach is to a great extent a synechistic
approach. But rather than taking his contribution to be completing what Peirce allegedly failed
to complete vis-à-vis Kant’s project, I take him to be carrying forward what Peirce so dramatically
exemplified – a synechistic approach to normative science and metaphysical inquiry, rooted in a
phenomenological and indeed mathematical insights into continuity. When he draws explicitly
on Fernando Zalamea’s  work on Peirce’s  concept  of  continuity  (see  especially  Zalamea 2012:
50ff.), The Philosophy of Gesture gathers a power and focus it does not display when he is trying to
show how Peirce needs to be assisted by the philosophical innovation of the complete gesture. He
is  in  effect  tracing  out  not  only  a  distinctively  Peircean trajectory  but  also  in  substantively
Peircean terms. I have no question that Maddalena’s philosophical innovation is an important
one, though not for the purpose he has designed it!
12. Of these facets, he does the least justice to the temporal and, more narrowly, the historical
features of the ongoing processes and practices falling with the scope of his concern, the most
justice to the formally semiotic and irreducibly ontological features. 
13. “Imagine,” Kenneth Burke as us, “that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive,
others have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a discussion too
heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the discussion has already
begun long before any of them go there, so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all
the steps that had gone before. You listen for a while, until you decide that you have caught the
tenor  of  the  argument;  then  you  put  in  your  own oar.  Someone answers.  You  answer  him;
another comes to your defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the embarrassment
or gratification of your opponent, depending upon the quality of the ally’s assistance. However,
the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must depart. And you do depart, with
the discussion still vigorously in progress” (Burke 1941: 110-11; quoted in Bernstein 1971: 221,
note 36). 
14. Tuism is a word Peirce apparent coined to name the “doctrine that all thought is addressed to
a second person [a thou or tu],  or to one’s future self as a second person” (quoted in Max H.
Fisch’s Introduction to W 1).
15. Even the most charitable reader is, at some level, talking back to the text being interpreted,
posing questions regarding the basic meaning of key terms and countless other matters. That is,
even (perhaps especially) the most charitable interpreter must be, in Peirce’s words, a “Reader
Loquitur.”
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